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The isolation and treatment of symptomatic individuals, coupled with the quarantining of individuals that have
a high risk of having been infected, constitute two commonly used epidemic control measures. Although isolation is
probably always a desirable public health measure, quarantine is more controversial. Mass quarantine can inﬂict
signiﬁcant social, psychological, and economic costs without resulting in the detection of many infected individuals.
The authors use probabilistic models to determine the conditions under which quarantine is expected to be useful.
Results demonstrate that the number of infections averted (per initially infected individual) through the use of quar-
antine is expected to be very low provided that isolation is effective, but it increases abruptly and at an accelerating
rate as the effectiveness of isolation diminishes. When isolation is ineffective, the use of quarantine will be most
beneﬁcial when there is signiﬁcant asymptomatic transmission and if the asymptomatic period is neither very long
nor very short.
communicable diseases, emerging; disease outbreaks; epidemiologic methods; patient isolation; quarantine;
SARS virus
Abbreviation: SARS, severe acute respiratory syndrome.
When theglobal severe acute respiratory syndrome (SARS)
outbreak began in 2003, public health officials in all affected
areas scrambled to introduce measures aimed at controlling
its spread. Initially, this mainly involved alerting health-care
providers and providing themwith diagnostic protocols. This
allowed many of the SARS cases to be identified, thereby
making the isolation and treatment of infected individuals
more effective. It was soon recognized, however, that the
extent towhich the disease had spread was much greater than
initially thought (1–4). As a result, several countries/regions
introduced the use of mass quarantine for all individuals
suspected of having had contact with a confirmedSARS case.
These coordinated global efforts were remarkably effective
at curtailing the spread of the disease, and to date SARS has
not made a significant reemergence.
This recent experience with SARS has illustrated that
there are two central questions that must be addressed by
policy makers in the face of an emerging or reemerging
infectious disease. The first is whether or not basic public
health measures, such as isolation (i.e., the removal of
symptomatic individuals from the general population) and
quarantine (i.e., the removal of individuals who have had
contact with an infected individual but are not displaying
symptoms), are likely to be sufficient to control the spread of
the disease. A recent paper by Fraser et al. (5) has provided
a very general answer to this question, and they demonstrate
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that the crucial factors are the extent to which the disease is
transmitted asymptomatically, as well as its basic reproduc-
tion number (5).
For cases where these basic public health measures are
sufficient (e.g., SARS), the second question is then whether
or not both isolation and quarantine should be used. For
example, even in retrospect, it is not clear whether isolation
or quarantine had the greater impact in stopping the spread
of SARS, or whether both control measures were essential
(1, 6–9). This is an important question, because the use of
mass quarantine is controversial. In the case of SARS, for
example, only a tiny percentage of the quarantined individ-
uals were actually infected (7, 8, 10). While it is true that the
removal of even a small number of infected individuals from
the general population is likely to be beneficial from the
standpoint of community health, it definitely impinges upon
individual rights and freedoms. Moreover, as seen in the
case of SARS, it also imposes considerable economic and
social costs (10–12).
By use of a variety of modeling approaches, several pre-
vious studies have examined the extent to which quarantine
was probably important in stopping the spread of SARS in
different locales. These include the typical continuous-time
or discrete-time compartmental models tailored specifically
to the case of SARS (13–17), as well as more sophisticated
contact-network models (18, 19). Although the results are
somewhat mixed, a reasonably general conclusion stemming
from all of the above studies is that SARS is likely to be
effectively contained in the absence of quarantine only if very
stringent and effective isolation measures are in place.
In this article, we derive general mathematical results that
predict the number of infections averted when quarantine is
used in addition to isolation for arbitrary diseases. Our goal
is to elucidate the factors that make quarantine a relatively
effective control measure for some diseases but not for
others. We suppose that an emerging infectious disease is
in the initial stages of spreading within a community and
assume that isolation and treatment of symptomatic individ-
uals are about to be imposed as the primary measures to halt
the spread of the disease. Our index of the utility of quar-
antine is the number of infections that can be averted if
quarantine is used in addition to isolation/treatment. We
relate the expected utility of quarantine to observable pa-
rameters of a disease outbreak, so that it might be used to
inform policy decisions.
MATERIALS AND METHODS
The transmission of many diseases can be viewed as
a branching process, whereby each infected individual gives
rise to some number of new infections before either dying or
recovering (Web appendix 1). (This information is described
in the first of four supplementary appendices; each is re-
ferred to as ‘‘Web appendix’’ in the text and is posted on
the Journal’s website (http://aje.oxfordjournals.org/).) Typ-
ically, we expect the number of susceptible hosts to decline
during this process, but because we are considering the ini-
tial stages of an emerging infectious disease, the number of
susceptible individuals will be largely unaffected by the
transmission process over the timescale of interest. For ex-
ample, in the case of SARS, of the approximately 4 million
people in the greater Toronto area, only 225 satisfied the
case definition of SARS (6).
Given these considerations, in the absence of quarantine,
the spread of the disease can be modeled by assuming that
each infected individual produces a random number of new
infections, RI, the value of which is drawn from some prob-
ability distribution, pI(). This number of new infections
includes those generated in all stages of the disease, in the
absence of quarantine but in the presence of isolation. For
example, it includes all new infections produced while
asymptomatic, while symptomatic but not isolated, and
while isolated and receiving treatment. The subscript ‘‘I’’
refers to the fact that isolation alone is being used.
If quarantine is used in addition to isolation, then there are
two pathways down which an infected individual can travel
(figure 1). First, an infected individual can eventually be
quarantined before developing symptoms and being placed
in isolation. We assume that this happens with probability, q.
Thus, if considerable effort and resources are put into quar-
antine (e.g., through the use of thorough contact tracing),
then q will be relatively large. Conversely, q ¼ 0 in the
absence of quarantine. Second, an infected individual might
escape being quarantined and therefore be removed from the
general population only after developing symptoms. This
happens with probability 1  q. We note that, in reality, q
will undoubtedly change through time as the efficacy of
quarantine procedures increases during an outbreak, but
our goal here is to examine the effectiveness of a constant
level of quarantine. In this sense, our results can be viewed
as a best-case scenario for the utility of quarantine.
Individuals that escape being quarantined generate the
same number of new infections as would occur in the ab-
sence of quarantine procedures. For those individuals that
are placed into quarantine, the number of new infections
generated will differ from this. Infections might still be
generated while in the asymptomatic stage (before being
quarantined), and they can also be generated while in quar-
antine and/or while in isolation after symptoms develop. We
assume that the number of infections generated by such
FIGURE 1. A schematic diagram of the two pathways down which
an infected individual can move when quarantine protocols are in
place.
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individuals is also a random variable, RQI, but it is drawn
from a different distribution, pQI().
A key parameter in the results that follow is q[
ð RI  RQIÞ= RI ;where the overbars denote expectations. This
is the proportion of the infections generated by an individ-
ual that will be stopped by quarantine. The presence of quar-
antine can affect q in two separate ways. First, even if there
is no asymptomatic transmission of disease, the use of quar-
antine might cause q to be nonzero if it allows the more rapid
identification and isolation of symptomatic individuals (7–9).
As such, the use of quarantine actually affects the number of
infections generated by symptomatic individuals. Second, if
quarantine has no effect on transmission from symptomatic
individuals, it will still cause q to be nonzero if there is some
transmission during the asymptomatic phase. In this case, if
individuals no longer transmit the disease once they are
placed in quarantine, then q can be interpreted as the pro-
portion of infections that are generated by asymptomatic in-
dividuals (because the use of quarantine will then prevent all
of these infections).
Given the parameters q and q, the product qq lies between
zero and one, and it is an index of the effectiveness of
quarantine at the level of infected individuals; qq ¼ 0 only
when quarantine is absent (i.e., q ¼ 0) and/or when placing
an individual into quarantine has no effect on the number of
infections that he/she generates (e.g., because there is no
asymptomatic transmission and quarantine does not im-
prove isolation procedures). Conversely, qq  1 only if all
infected asymptomatic individuals are identified and quar-
antined (i.e., q ¼ 1) and if quarantine (in conjunction with
isolation) prevents all disease transmission (i.e., q ¼ 1).
RESULTS
In the case where RI > 1, quarantine is clearly necessary,
and our analysis (Web appendix 2) shows that the benefit
can be substantial. Now suppose that isolation alone can
stop the spread of disease (i.e., RI < 1), so that the expected
total number of infections occurring in the absence of quar-
antine will approach a constant value as time passes. Quar-
antine might nevertheless still be useful in this context by
reducing the number of infections that occur before the out-
break ends. We denote the number of infections averted by
generation n by Dn (index cases belong to generation 0,
those they infect belong to generation 1, and so on). The
expected number of infections averted by quarantine once
the epidemic has ended is
DN¼
RIð1qqÞ RI
1ð1qqÞ RI
 
I0
1 RI
 
ð1Þ
(Web appendix 2), where I0 is the initial number of infections.
The notation in the first set of parentheses in equation 1
represents the percentage of infections that quarantine can be
expected to avert. Figure 2a plots equation 1 with I0 ¼ 1 for
different values of the product qq. This represents the number
of cases averted by quarantine for each initially infected in-
dividual. Even if quarantine is extremely effective (i.e.,
qq ¼ 1), which requires that all asymptomatic individuals
be identified and placed into quarantine (i.e., q ¼ 1) and that
an individual generates no new infections once quarantined
(i.e., q ¼ 1), quarantine still has only a marginal effect on the
expected number of infections averted over a wide range in
RI (which, recall, is the expected number of infections gen-
erated by an infected person if isolation alone is used). For
example, if the reproduction number is RI ¼ 0.5, then quar-
antine is predicted to prevent only one extra infection for
each individual that was initially infected. The number of
infections averted becomes significant, only when the effec-
tiveness of isolation decreases to the point where it is no
longer able to stop the spread of disease (i.e., only when RI
approaches one). Also note that, because of the form of
equation 1, its predictions are relatively insensitive to error
in the estimates of RI unless RI is close to one (figure 2).
Part of the reason that the expected number of infections
averted is very small stems from the fact that, unless the
reproduction number, RI, is close to one, very few infections
will occur even if isolation alone is used. This can be better
illustrated by plotting the percentage of infections that are
averted by quarantine (i.e., the first factor in equation 1).
Figure 2b illustrates how this increases to 100 percent when
the effectiveness of isolation decreases (i.e., when RI in-
creases). We can also see that, if most infections are gener-
ated by symptomatic individuals and if quarantine does little
in terms of increasing the efficiency of isolation procedures
(so that q  1), then quarantine will have very little effect
on the number of cases averted or on the percentage averted.
On the other hand, for the case where both q and q are near
one (which are the conditions under which quarantine will
have its greatest effect), then the percentage of infections
averted by quarantine can be approximated by
P  RI : ð2Þ
Equation 2 is particularly simple, illustrating that, under this
best-case scenario, the percentage of infections averted by
quarantine is equal to the reproduction number when only
isolation is used.
The above results give an expectation of the number of
infections averted by quarantine, but how likely is it that, by
chance, the number might be greater than this? This ques-
tion is more difficult to answer but, subject to some mild
assumptions, one can derive a conservative estimate that
applies for any distribution of infections generated by each
infected individual, p1() or pQI() (Web appendix 2). Figure 3
plots a conservative 80th-percentile upper bound on the
number of infections averted through the use of quarantine,
for the best-case scenario in which the probability of quar-
antining an infected individual is one (i.e., q¼ 1). There is at
least an 80 percent probability that the actual number of
infections averted through the use of perfect quarantine in
any given outbreak lies below these upper bounds. These
results are very general and further strengthen the finding
that quarantine is unlikely to have a significant impact unless
isolation alone is relatively ineffective (i.e., RI is large).
Furthermore, these analytical results appear to be quite con-
servative when judged against results from a fully stochastic
simulation (Web appendix 3).
Further insight can be gained from the above results by
examining the case where there is very little asymptomatic
transmission (q is small). This appears to be true for several
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diseases (table 1; Web appendix 4), including SARS (1, 4, 9,
20). To apply the results to SARS, we require an estimate for
the reproduction number when isolation alone is being used.
There are currently no direct estimates of this parameter
available, but we can estimate it indirectly by using the
component parameter estimates of Gumel et al. (14). Bear-
ing in mind the uncertainty in such estimates, we obtain
a potential range of values from RI ¼ 0.28 to RI ¼ 0.46.
Taking RI ¼ 0.5 as a conservative estimate, the results given
by the bold curve in figure 3 (for which q ¼ 0.05) suggest
that there is a probability of at least 80 percent that the use of
perfect quarantine for SARS (i.e., q ¼ 1) would reduce the
number of cases by no more than approximately 2.6 cases
for each initially infected person (assuming that the values
rI ¼ 0.5 and rQI ¼ 0.25 of figure 3 are reasonable for
SARS). This is a very conservative upper bound on the
expected outcome, however, and therefore, unless the vari-
ance in the number of infections generated by individuals is
much larger than those used to generate figure 3, the use of
quarantine is predicted to have very little effect. As a result,
investing limited resources in ensuring that isolation is very
effective (e.g., quick removal of symptomatic people from
the population; extremely secure isolation facilities to pre-
vent transmission by such individuals) is likely to be a much
more valuable control strategy for SARS than the use of
mass quarantine.
FIGURE 2. The effect of the reproduction number in the presence of isolation, RI, on the efﬁcacy of quarantine, as shown by the total expected
number of infections averted by quarantine during an epidemic for each initially infected person (a) and the percentage of infections averted by
quarantine during an epidemic (b). The parameter combination qq is an overall measure of the effectiveness of trying to place an individual into
quarantine, q is the probability that an asymptomatic individual will be identiﬁed and placed into quarantine, and q is the proportion of infections
generated by an individual that can be prevented by placing the individual into quarantine (which is roughly equal to the proportion of infections
generated by asymptomatic individuals).
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DISCUSSION
Our results indicate that there are three main require-
ments for quarantine to substantially reduce the number of
infections that occur during a disease outbreak. These are
the following: 1) a large disease reproduction number in the
presence of isolation alone; 2) a large proportion of infec-
tions generated by an individual that can be prevented
through quarantine, q; and 3) a large probability that an
asymptomatic infected individual will get placed into quar-
antine before he/she develops symptoms and is isolated, q.
Having a relatively large reproduction number in the pres-
ence of isolation is necessary for quarantine to have a sub-
stantial impact, but it is not sufficient. It must also be true
that a large proportion of infections generated by an indi-
vidual can be prevented through quarantine (i.e., q is large).
How can we estimate this parameter for different diseases?
As a first approximation, we can equate q with the propor-
tion of infections generated when an individual is asymp-
tomatic (5). We can then use the data on the length of
infectious periods, along with incubation, latency periods,
and the likelihood of completely asymptomatic infections oc-
curring for different diseases to estimate q (Web appendix 4).
Table 1 presents estimates of the proportion of infections
that are generated by asymptomatic individuals for a variety
of diseases. The diseases with the largest values of q are
smallpox and hepatitis B, whereas those with the smallest
values of q are whooping cough and scarlet fever.
Aside from the above disease-specific factors, there are
also some ways in which public health officials can increase
the parameter q. One possibility is to ensure the strictest
adherence to quarantine protocols. This will ensure that the
number of infections generated by individuals in quarantine
is as small as possible. Second, quarantine can be used to
enhance the speed of isolation of symptomatic individuals
(e.g., because asymptomatic individuals in quarantine are
under close scrutiny). In this case, quarantine would reduce
the number of infections generated by an individual, in part,
by reducing the number of infections generated by symp-
tomatic individuals. If this is the main reason for q being
large, however, then there is an alternative to quarantine that
might be more suitable. Rather than placing the suspected
FIGURE 3. Themean number of infections averted by quarantine (solid curves), along with the mean plus 2 standard deviations (dashed curves).
We expect at least 80 percent of the outcomes to lie below the bounds given by the dashed curves (Web appendix 2). Bold curves: rI ¼ 0.5, rQI ¼
0.25, q ¼ 0.05; thin curves: rI ¼ 0.5, rQI ¼ 0.25, q ¼ 0.95. All results assume that q ¼ 1.
TABLE 1. Estimates of the proportion of infections that are
generated by asymptomatic individuals, r, for a variety of
diseases*
Disease Proportion, q
Whooping cough 0.25
Scarlet fever 0.25
Measles 0.46
Inﬂuenza ~0.5
Chickenpox ~0.53
Mumps 0.74
Rubella 0.81
Diphtheria Relatively high
Poliomyelitis 0.97
Smallpox ~1
Hepatitis B ~1
* Refer to Web appendix 4 for more information. Quarantine is ex-
pected to be useful only for those diseases that have relatively large
values of q. Results are based on data from table 3.1 of Anderson
and May (23).
Quarantine and Isolation 483
Am J Epidemiol 2006;163:479–485
asymptomatic people into quarantine, simply inform them of
their status and tell them to report to a hospital at the first sign
of any symptoms. This approach has nearly all the benefits of
quarantine in terms of enhancing isolation procedures with-
out incurring the costs of actual quarantine.
Having a relatively large reproduction number and having
a relatively large value of q are not sufficient for quarantine
to have a substantial impact, either, however; it must also be
true that q can be made large. This is the probability that an
infected, asymptomatic individual will be placed into quar-
antine before he/she develops symptoms and is isolated. The
chief way in which this can be increased is by investing
more in rapid contact tracing. Nevertheless, there are two
reasons why this might still be infeasible.
First, if the duration of the asymptomatic period is too
short, then it is unlikely that much can be done to identify
infected individuals prior to their developing symptoms. Of
course, there might still be a benefit in attempting to do so
through the increased rate at which symptomatic individuals
are removed from the population, but this is a matter of
quarantine’s being useful through its effects on enhancing
isolation procedures rather than being useful in itself.
Second, if the duration of the asymptomatic period is
too long, then it will be extremely difficult to identify
those individuals that are likely to have been infected by a
given infected person (by virtue of their having had many
contacts during the asymptomatic phase). Furthermore, if
the asymptomatic period is very long, then the quarantine
period must also be correspondingly long (21). Such lengthy
quarantine periods would be very difficult to implement,
again making it unlikely that q can be made very large.
For example, even though the value of q is large for hepatitis
B (table 1), it is unlikely that q could be large enough for
quarantine to prove a useful control measure for this disease.
It is worth noting that public health interventions aimed at
increasing q (e.g., increased effort in contact tracing) might
also result in a beneficial increase in q. In the development
of the model, we have assumed that the likelihood of an
individual’s being placed into quarantine, q, varied indepen-
dently of q, the proportion of infections that are prevented
(per infected individual) by placing a person into quarantine.
For some quarantining techniques such as contact tracing,
however, increasing the resources devoted to this task in the
hopes of increasing q might also increase q. In other words,
not only would asymptomatic individuals have a greater
likelihood of being quarantined, but they would likely be
placed into quarantine more quickly as well (thereby poten-
tially increasing q). As a result, it is important to bear in
mind that any real-world public health intervention can re-
sult in alterations to more than one of the relevant parameters
in the theory developed here.
Finally, we note that the application of the above results for
any emerging or reemerging infectious disease rests heavily
on the ability to obtain an estimate of the disease reproduc-
tion number in the presence of isolation alone (i.e., RI). There
has been much research on the estimation of disease repro-
duction numbers in general, but a recent paper by Wallinga
and Teunis (22) offers the most useful approach in the context
of our results. From data from epidemic curves, these re-
searchers presented a real-time method that can be used to
estimate the reproduction number over time. Given that iso-
lation will often be the first invention used for emerging
diseases, this method might thereby be used to obtain quick
estimates of RI in the initial stages of an outbreak.
In summary, the above results suggest that the number of
infections averted through the use of quarantine is expected
to be very low provided that isolation is effective. If iso-
lation is ineffective, then the use of quarantine will be most
beneficial only when there is significant asymptomatic
transmission and if the asymptomatic period is neither very
long nor very short.
Editor’s note: References 24–32 are cited in the Web-
only appendices posted on the Journal’s website (http://aje.
oxfordjournals.org/).
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